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Federal Courts-Amount in Controversy-Aggregation of Claims
Against Co-defendant Insurance Companies
P was a passenger in his own automobile being driven by a
friend. He was injured in a collision with Dl's truck. P brought
a diversity action in the federal district court, alleging that the
combined negligence of both drivers caused his injuries. The forum
was Louisiana where under a direct action statute, an injured party
may bring an action directly against the tort-feasor's insurer. P
joined Dl (truck owner), D2 (truck owner's insurer), D3 (friend's
insurer) and D4 (P's insurer) as defendants and sought damages
of 150,000 dollars. D4's liability coverage for personal injury to
P was limited by the terms of the policy to 5,000 dollars. By the
terms of his friend's liability policy, D3 was liable only in excess of
D4's coverage. D4 sought dismissal asserting that the amount in
controversy does not exceed the sum or value of 10,000 dollars
as required, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1) (1958). The court dismissed the cause as to said insurer. Held, affirmed. Claims against
defendants were separate and distinct and the test of federal jurisdictional amount is the value of each claim and not their aggregate.
Jewell v. Grain Dealer's Mut. Ins. Co., 290 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1961).
The statutory provision upon which P relies stipulates that
federal courts shall have jurisdiction where the "matter in controversy" exceeds the sum or value of 10,000 dollars without reference to aggregation of claims or joinder of defendants. Jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction as to D4 is entirely dependent on the
meaning of "matter in controversy."
The general interpretive view and two groups of cases constituting exceptions were considered by the court. It failed to consider a third exceptional group of cases which may have influenced
its decision. The general view stems from Walter v. Northeastern
R.R., 147 U. S. 370 (1893), which held that when two or more
plaintiffs, having several interests, unite for the convenience of litigation in a single suit, it can only be sustained as to those whose
claims exceed the jurisdictional amount and when two or more
defendants are sued by the same plaintiff in one suit the test of
jurisdiction is the joint or several character of the liability to the
plaintiff.
The court, in the instant case, following the general view, relied on: Citizen's Bank of La. v. Cannon, 164 U.S. 319 (1896);
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Northern Pac. R.R. v. Walker, 148 U.S. 391 (1893); Walter v.
Northeastern R.R., supra; and Cornell v. Mabe, 206 F.2d 514
(5th Cir. 1953). In all of these cases the plaintiff asserted separate and distinct claims against several defendants and the respective courts held the test of existence of jurisdiction is the amount
in controversy (which is the value of the matter in controversy)
as to each claim and not their aggregate. Also in the present case
the court cites Payne v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 266 F.2d
63 (5th Cir. 1959), which presents an interesting question: Father
of the plaintiff sued the defendant insurer for 50,000 dollars for
personal injury to his minor child. The insurer by virtue of policy
terms was limited to 10,000 dollars personal injury liability and
5,000 dollars property damage liability. Defendant moved for dismissal on grounds of lack of jurisdictional amount. Plaintiff amended
the complaint to include fifteen dollars clothing damage in order
to maintain the litigation in the federal court. The court ruled that
the clothing damage was the father's loss and not the loss of the
plaintiff; therefore, the plaintiff and his father as co-plaintiffs were
suing the defendant on two separate and distinct claims which could
not be aggregated to make up the jurisdictional amount. The first
exception noted provided that claims against two or more defendants
can be aggregated to attain jurisdictional amount in controversy if
they are jointly liable to the plaintiff. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Chicago,
Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 229 F.2d 584 (10th Cir. 1956).
The second exception noted in the Aetna case, supra, provided for
the extension of the first exception to suits against two or more
insurance companies, each of which has separately insured against
a stated risk for a sum less than jurisdictional amount. A group of
cases constituting a third exception to the general view was not
considered. This latter group takes cognizance of the problem of
apportioning the plaintiff's loss or damage among several defendants
who have contributed severally to injure the plaintiff. McAtamney
v. Commonwealth Hotel Const. Co., 296 Fed. 500 (S.D. N.Y. 1924),
held: A bill asserting claim of 2,800 dollars against one defendant
and 2,500 dollars against another defendant and further alleging
that assets and property of the two defendants are commingled so
that only by trial could it be adjudicated whether claims should be
apportioned, partly to one and partly to the other, was held to
state a common claim in excess of jurisdictional limit and the federal
court had jurisdiction. In the instant case, though the assets of
the various defendants are not in issue it appears that proper ap-
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portionment of liability where part of the liability is primary and
part is excess could best be determined in one trial under the theory
of equity. Though not applicable to the circumstances of the instant
case, a fourth type of exception is permitted. Skokomish Indian
Tribe v. France, 269 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1959), held that where
land involved in a quiet title action was comprised essentially of
a single tract, the value of the entire tract was to be considered as
jurisdictional amount in controversy even though interest in the
tract was claimed by several defendants.
The court adverted to the general interpretation of "matter in
controversy" in spite of the fact that the circumstances of the cases
cited in support of its decision appear to be readily distinguishable
from those of the instant case. Walter v. Northeastern R.R.,
supra, refused the plaintiff the right to join several counties as
defendants in a federal court injunction suit to avoid payment of
locally assessed taxes, where the taxes due to any one county were
not sufficient to meet the jurisdictional amount. The court established the rule that claims could not be aggregated against multiple
defendants unless the liability of the defendants was joint and not
several. The plaintiff in the Walter case was piling up distinct
claims, but see Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tel-Mor Garage Corp., 92
F. Supp. 445 (S.D. N.Y. 1950), which held that plaintiff, insurer
who became subrogated to the rights of three assureds who lost
their automobiles in a fire caused by the negligence of the defendants, could properly combine the three claims to constitute
the amount required to confer jurisdiction. Sudderth v. National
Lead Co., 272 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1959), permitted plaintiff to
join several defendant converters where the total amount in controversy exceeded the jurisdictional minimum but where the defendant's individual liability did not. The converters in this case
did not act in concert so it is doubtful that their liability could be
considered joint. The latter two cases seem to refute the general
interpretation of the Walter case, supra, and the two groups of exceptions stated in the Aetna case, supra. The general view plus the
many exceptions provides a court with a dilemma.
Perhaps a different ruling would have resulted, had the court
utilized the definition approach furnished by Associated Press v.
Emmett, 45 F. Supp. 907 (S.D. Cal. 1942), wherein "matter in controversy" was defined as the subject of litigation, the matter upon
which the action is brought and issue is joined. In the instant case
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the P sought satisfaction of one claim, not two or more claims,
and the specific matter in controversy upon which his claim is based
was the accident caused by the negligence of the defendants. In
Louisiana the liability insurers are liable in solido with their insureds
and they occupy the same position as the insured for purposes of
litigation. In Gray v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 31 F. Supp. 299
(W.D. La. 1940), the court held that where insured parties of two
different liability insurance companies are joint tort-feasors, their
respective insurers may be regarded as incurring a liability to the
injured person as themselves joint tort-feasors, and as being liable
solidarily to such injured person. It was further held that all related
matters growing out of one occurrence, a highway accident, will
be settled, definitely and clearly, in one action. Joint tort-feasors,
if there be any, will be enabled to exercise their legal right to
demand contribution among themselves. The court stated "this
is the law of Louisiana and it is fulfilled thus in one suit." It further
stated that it is "well known that more truth reaches the surface
if all related matters be considered and all involved persons be
heard at one and the same trial ...

the substantive law of the state

is to be applied by way of the procedural law of the federal courts."
The propriety of the decision in the instant case must be
determined by a fundamental consideration of the purpose of diversity
actions. Diversity jurisdiction originated to protect non-resident
litigants against the threat of state court provincialism but from the
very first grant of original jurisdiction by the Congress to inferior
federal courts a jurisdictional limitation in dollar amount was established. The amount first involved was 500 dollars, and no doubt
was justifiable on the grounds that transportation difficulties in
colonial days were a proper reason for denial of federal jurisdiction
in truly trivial claims. In short, the cost of getting to court and
the inconvenience of getting there was not worth the effort unless
some minimum claim was involved. Subsequently, the amount in
controversy limitation has been successively raised, and it is now
used simply as a valve to restrict the number of cases which may
be originated in the federal courts. It becomes difficult at this point
to relate the dollar amount of a claim to the importance or fairness
of having a federal forum available to hear such a claim, and the
rules which permit certain kinds of claims to be aggregated in
order to attain the jurisdictional minimum become, at best, arbitrary.
It would seem appropriate under such circumstances, that once a
controversy is in the federal court, to permit all elements of that
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controversy to be resolved in a single suit in order to conserve judicial
time and effort.
Edward Andrew Zagula
Future Interests-Rule Against Perpetuities-Construction
of Interest as Vested or Contingent
The residuary clause of T's will provided that the balance of
his estate was to go to his wife, W, for her lifetime, and then to
his two daughters, X and Y, for their lifetime, "and upon their
death their share is to be divided equally between their children
when they reach the age of 25 years." T left surviving him W, X, Y,
and five grandchildren who were all minors. In an action to construe the will, the trial court held that the remainder interest to
the grandchildren was void because it violated the rule against perpetuities. Held, reversed. The remainder in fee vested in the infant
grandchildren at testator's death, subject to open so as to make
room for any children thereafter born to testator's daughters. At
the death of the daughters of the testator the quantum of interest
of each of the grandchildren will become fixed and certain. The
grandchildren will be entitled to possession immediately upon the
death of the daughters, and, according to the wishes of the testator,
the property is not to be partitioned and allotted to the grandchildren
until they reach the age of 25 years, or until the death of their
mother, whichever is later. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor,
120 S.E.2d 588 (N.C. 1961).
The principal case presents an interesting problem of construction on which the courts are not entirely in harmony. The
first issue which arises in these cases is whether the words, "when,"
"at," "after," and other similar words, make a testamentary gift
contingent. For if the gift is contingent, the rule against perpetuities
will invalidate the gift if it is possible that the gift might not vest
within lives in being and 21 years thereafter.
The early English decision in Clobberie's Case, 2 Vent. 342,
86 Eng. Rep. 476 (C.P. 1676), laid the groundwork in this area
of the law. The court there held that, if there be a gift to A to
be paid at the age of 21, the interest in A is vested; but, if there
be a gift to A at 21, the interest in A is contingent. In the first case
A owns the gift absolutely at the time it is made to him, but his
enjoyment of the gift is withheld until he reaches 21. However, in
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